Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation by Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 953
CATEGORY 10: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL METHODS
MAY 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 953
COMPETITIVE MARKETS, COLLECTIVE DECISIONS
AND GROUP FORMATION
Abstract
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Concurrent interest in the formation, composition, stability, and decision
making of households or, more generally, socio-economic groups requires a
formal framework that incorporates the allocation of commodities to con-
sumers and of people to households. We are going to analyze a general
equilibrium model with multi-member households where such a dual alloca-
tion is brought about by three interacting mechanisms, each operating at a
particular level of aggregation: Individual decisions are made to join or leave
households. Collective decisions within households determine the consump-
tion plans of household members. Competitive exchange across households
achieves a feasible allocation of resources. Clearly, the three mechanisms in-
teract. The household structure (that is the partition of the population into
households) and the attractiveness of alternative households aﬀect market
prices and the allocation of resources among consumers. Conversely, market
prices and the implied market opportunities inﬂuence the formation and sta-
bility of households. An economic theory of pure exchange among households
ought to account for these interdependencies.
When dealing with household formation, one of the most critical modeling
assumptions is how much choice between households an individual has. Here
we consider a ﬁnite pure exchange economy with variable household structure
and focus on two types of outside options available to household members.
We ﬁrst develop the concept of a competitive equilibrium with free
exit (CEFE) where household members have one type of outside option,
the “exit option” (EO): an individual may decide to leave its household
and become single if this is to its advantage. Then we develop the concept
of competitive equilibrium with free household formation (CEFH)
which adds a second type of outside option, the “joining option” (JO): an
individual may decide to leave its household and get accepted by another
household or individual if this beneﬁts all members of the resulting enlarged
household.
The choice of threat points in households has been examined in a number
of papers surveyed in Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994). This literature
suggests that it is diﬃcult to identify threat points empirically. Therefore, in
our theoretical analysis, we start with the exit option as the narrowest view
2advanced in the literature on how individuals behave in households.1 Then
we are broadening the set of outside options.
Our approach follows the seminal contribution of Becker (1973) who has
demonstrated that an inquiry into the determinants of and connections be-
tween sociological and economic choices can be very productive. We use
a diﬀerent model and address diﬀerent questions. For instance, household-
speciﬁc externalities play an important role in our approach. In contrast,
Becker’s model avoids consumption externalities in a unique way, by intro-
ducing a “household good”, the sole explicit consumption good which is non-
tradable, yet perfectly divisible within each household and does not cause any
consumption externalities.
Our investigation of interacting allocation and decision mechanisms begins
with Gersbach and Haller (2001) where we follow Haller (2000) and incor-
porate the collective rationality concept of Chiappori (1988, 1992) into a
general equilibrium framework. There we perform welfare analysis with a
variable household structure, but no outside options.2 An allocation consists
of a household structure and an allocation of commodities to individual con-
sumers. A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned accordingly. A household
resides in a competitive market environment and makes eﬃcient collective
consumption decisions for its members. This setting has allowed us to study
the interaction between two allocation mechanisms: collective decisions and
competitive markets. This basic model will be amended in the present paper,
introducing the two types of outside options, EO and JO, which constitute
elements of a third allocation mechanism, the individual choice of household
membership. Our conclusions are three-fold.
1In particular, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) provide an empirical justiﬁcation
of divorce as a threat point. They study the eﬀect of a “divorce laws index” on intra-
household decisions. This index measures how favorable are state divorce law provisions
to women and ranges between 1 and 4 in the sample, with a mean of 2.48 and a standard
error of 0.88. It can be viewed as a rough proxy for the value of the exit option available to
women. Chiappori et al. use 1988 PSID data of 1618 US households where both spouses
have positive hours of work and are between 30 and 60 years old. They estimate that a
one point increase in the divorce laws index induces husbands to transfer an additional
$4,310 of nonlabor income to their wives. This suggests a considerable impact of the exit
option on the intra-household decision process, given that the average nonlabor income
per household was approximately $8,000.
2Corresponding equilibrium existence results can be found in Gersbach and Haller
(1999).
3First, we establish a neutrality theorem which asserts that in the absence
of externalities, the set of CEFE is identical to the set of CEFH and equal
to the set of (traditional) competitive equilibria when all individuals act and
trade individually. Therefore, if group or household formation does not create
any group or consumption externalities, individuals remain powerless in the
sense that every individual can fare no better and no worse as a member of a
multi-member household than as an individual market participant. The exit
threat is suﬃcient for this to hold and adding more outside options aﬀects
neither equilibrium existence nor equilibrium welfare under these particular
circumstances.
Second, suppose that more outside options, say addition of JO, eliminate
some but not all competitive equilibria with free exit. One might conjec-
ture that more stringent equilibrium conditions make the surviving equilibria
“stronger” or “better”, having passed more tests than the eliminated ones.
It turns out that this conclusion is premature if “better” means “Pareto-
superior”: A surviving equilibrium can be weakly Pareto-dominated by an
eliminated one. This kind of result suggests that the availability and aware-
ness of more outside options can be socially harmful. It can destabilize
households and, therefore, the household structure. However, the availabil-
ity and people’s awareness of more outside options need not always be socially
harmful. The welfare comparison, in the sense of Pareto, of competitive equi-
libria with free exit which are also competitive equilibria with free household
formation and those which are not, can go either way.
Third, we establish existence of non-trivial CEFE. We also ﬁnd that the ad-
ditional outside option, JO, can eliminate all competitive equilibria with free
exit. Whereas there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit under
standard assumptions, there need not exist a competitive equilibrium with
free household formation under the same assumptions. Still, competitive
equilibria with free household formation exist in many instances. One ex-
ample is the case of pure group exteralities and a unique optimal household
structure with respect to group preferences. Another example is the case of
one private good and group externalities such that household formation can
be reduced to a two-sided matching problem. But we also provide a counter-
example, Example 6, with two private goods and household formation re-
ducible to a two-sided matching problem. In Example 6, stable matchings
and market clearing cannot be achieved simultaneously. This kind of market
failure is notably absent from the vast majority of the matching literature
4where markets are inactive and relative prices are irrelevant, simply because
there exits at most one tradable commodity.
Our model is related to the club literature and the literatures on hedonic
coalitions, matching, assignment games, and multilateral bargaining. The
innovative approach to club theory taken by Ellickson et al. (1999, 2001)
resembles ours in that it also deals with the allocation of individuals to groups
(clubs, households) and the allocation of commodities to individuals. In our
model, only the household at large is subject to a budget constraint and not
necessarily each member. In contrast, club theory assumes that every club
member is subject to an individual budget constraint. Both in household and
in club models, individuals (indirectly or directly) participate in anonymous
and competitive global markets and consider themselves exposed to market
conditions on which they have no inﬂuence. One of the distinguishing features
of the collective rationality assumption on households is that individuals do
enjoy inﬂuence at the local or household level while they are without inﬂuence
in the global market place. The precise relationship of our model to the club
literature has been discussed in detail in the introduction and subsection 5.3
of Gersbach and Haller (2001).
We would further like to stress that Example 6 puts the traditional literature
on matching into perspective. Namely, most of the work on hedonic coali-
tions [e.g. Greenberg (1978), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), Banerjee et
al. (2001)], matching [e.g. Gale and Shapley (1962), Alkan (1988), Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)], assignment games [e.g. Shapley and Shubik (1972), Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)], and multilateral bargaining [e.g. Rochford (1984),
Crawford and Rochford (1986), Bennett (1988, 1997)] focuses on group for-
mation and lacks competitive markets for commodities. Consequently, this
literature fails to observe that in general, stable matchings and market clear-
ing cannot be achieved simultaneously.3
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce the
model. In section 3, we deﬁne and discuss the equilibrium concepts. Welfare
properties of CEFE and CEFH are studied in section 4. Existence issues are
addressed in sections 5 and 6. We conclude with section 7. Lenghtier proofs
are collected in an appendix, section 8.
3A noteworthy exception are Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980) who combine the concepts
of individual stability and price equilibrium, but conﬁne the analysis of their most com-
prehensive model to an instructive example.
52 Consumer Characteristics and Allocations
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model: consumers,
household structures, commodities, endowments, allocations, and prefer-
ences.
Consumers and Household Structures. We consider a ﬁnite population
of consumers, represented by a set I = f1;:::;ng. A generic consumer is
denoted i or j. The population I is partitioned into households4, i.e. there
exists a partition P of I into non-empty subsets. We call any such partition
P a household structure in I. A generic household is denoted h or g.
Relative to P, we use the following terminology regarding i 2 I and h µ I,
h 6= ;:
“household h exists” or “household h is formed” iﬀ h 2 P;
“i belongs to h” or “individual i is a member of household h” iﬀ i 2 h.
If P consists of H households, we frequently label them h = 1;:::;H, pro-
vided this causes no confusion. We treat the household structure as an ob-
ject of endogenous choice. Households are endogenously formed so that some
household structure P is ultimately realized. Consequently, our consumer
allocation space is P, the set of all household structures in I.
Commodities. There exists a ﬁnite number ` ¸ 1 of commodities. Thus
the commodity space is I R
`. Each commodity is formally treated as a pri-
vate good, possibly with externalities in consumption. Consumer i 2 I has
consumption set Xi = I R
`
+ so that the commodity allocation space is
X ´
Q
j2I Xj. Generic elements of X are denoted x = (xi), y = (yi). Com-
modities are denoted by superscripts k = 1;:::;`. For a potential household
h µ I, h 6= ;, set Xh =
Q
i2h Xi, the consumption set for household h. Xh
has generic elements xh = (xi)i2h. If x = (xi)i2I 2 X is a commodity alloca-
tion, then consumption for household h is the restriction of x = (xi)i2I to h,
xh = (xi)i2h.
Endowments. For a potential household h µ I;h 6= ;, its endowment
is a commodity bundle !h 2 I R
` given by the sum of the endowments of all
participating individuals: !h =
P
i2h !fig. The social endowment is given
4While we stick to the suggestive term “household”, a broader interpretation as socio-
economic group or simply group would be quite appropriate in many instances, in par-











Allocations. An allocation is a pair (x;P) 2 X £ P specifying the con-
sumption bundle and household membership of each consumer. We call an
allocation (x;P) 2 X £ P feasible, if
X
i2I
xi = !S: (2)
After the speciﬁcation of individual preferences, by means of utility repre-
sentations, an allocation determines the welfare of each and every member
of society.
Consumer Preferences. In principle, a consumer might have preferences
on the allocation space X £ P and care about each and every detail of an
allocation. For individual i 2 I, we assume that i has preferences on X £ P
represented by a utility function Ui :X £ P¡! I R.
In the following, we shall make the general assumption that an individual
does not care about the features of an allocation beyond the boundaries of his
own household. If a particular household structure is given, he is indiﬀerent
about the aﬃliation and consumption of individuals not belonging to his own
household. Condition HSP is a formal expression of this assumption, with a
slight abuse of notation.
(HSP) Household-Speciﬁc Preferences:
Ui(x;P) = Ui(xh;h) for i 2 h, h 2 P, (x;P) 2 X £ P.
The general assumption HSP is justiﬁable on the grounds that we want to
design a model where multi-member households play a signiﬁcant allocative
role. HSP still admits a lot of ﬂexibility. For example, it permits various
kinds of consumption externalities within households. Suitable externalities
may prevent the formation of certain households, even though we are not
explicitly restricting household size. In the sequel, we shall in particular
exploit the occurrence of pure group externalities that depend solely on the
7persons belonging to a household. Pure group externalities can capture all
aspects of the beneﬁts of human beings living together. They can represent,
for instance, the emotional beneﬁt from living together with other persons
in the same household or the opportunity for receiving advice. To formulate
the latter externalities, deﬁne Hi ´ fh µ Iji 2 hg for i 2 I. Hi is the set of
potential households of which i would be a member.
(PGE) Pure Group Externalities: For each consumer i, there exist
functions Uc
i : Xi ! I R and U
g
i : Hi ! I R such that
Ui(xh;h) = Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h) for xh 2 Xh;h 2 Hi.
PGE assumes that one can additively separate the pure consumption eﬀect
Uc
i (xi) from the pure group eﬀect U
g
i (h). A very special case is the absence
of externalities, corresponding to U
g
i ´ 0. At the other extreme lies the
purely hedonic case, with Uc
i ´ 0 or ` = 0, studied by Banerjee et al. (2001)
and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
All of our examples with the exception of Example 6 feature pure group
externalities. But one should emphasize that despite their prominent role,
our analysis is not conﬁned to the case of pure group externalities. See in
particular Propositions 3, 4, and 6.
3 The Equilibrium Concepts
Among the several conceivable ways to formulate an equilibrium state of a
model with variable household structure, we deﬁne an equilibrium of com-
modities and consumers as a price system together with a household structure
and a feasible resource allocation such that:
² a household chooses an eﬃcient consumption schedule for its members,
subject to the household budget constraint;
² markets clear;
² no individual has an incentive to leave a household and to participate
as an individual in the market at the going prices.
8These three conditions deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with free exit. We
shall further allow for a second outside option:
² no individual can leave a household and get accepted by another house-
hold by proposing a feasible allocation for the enlarged household which
makes everybody in this newly formed household better oﬀ at the going
prices.
Adding the second option deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium with free house-
hold formation.
3.1 Deﬁnitions
In order to deﬁne the equilibrium concepts formally, we consider a household
h 2 P and a price system p 2 I R
`. For xh = (xi)i2h 2 Xh;








denotes the expenditure of household h on household consumption plan xh at
the price system p. As p and xh are of diﬀerent dimension for multi-member
households, we use the ¤-product in lieu of the familiar inner product. Then
h’s budget set is deﬁned as
Bh(p) = fxh 2 Xh : p ¤ xh · p ¢ !hg:
We next deﬁne the eﬃcient budget set EBh(p) as the set of xh 2 Bh(p)
with the property that there is no yh 2 Bh(p) such that
Ui(yh;h) ¸ Ui(xh;h) for all i 2 h;
Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xh;h) for some i 2 h.
Further deﬁne a state of the economy as a triple (p;x;P) such that p 2 I R
`
is a price system and (x;P) 2 X £ P is an allocation, i.e. x = (xi)i2I is an
allocation of commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a household
structure, a partition of the population into households). A state (p;x;P)
is a competitive equilibrium with free exit (CEFE) if it satisﬁes the
following conditions:
91. xh 2 EBh(p) for all h 2 P.
2.
P
i xi = !S.
3. There is no h 2 P, i 2 h and yi 2 Bfig(p) such that
Ui(yi;fig) > Ui(xh;h).
Finally a competitive equilibrium with free household formation
(CEFH) is a CEFE (p;x;P) that also satisﬁes:
4. There are no h and g 2 P, i 2 h and yg[fig 2 Bg[fig(p) such that
Uj(yg[fig;g [ fig) > Uj(xg;g) for all j 2 g;
Ui(yg[fig;g [ fig) > Ui(xh;h):
3.2 Discussion
Condition 1 reﬂects collective rationality in the sense of Chiappori (1988,
1992), in contrast to the traditional “unitary” model where households are
treated like single consumers. Eﬃcient choice by the household refers to
the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not merely to the
aggregate consumption bundle of the household. Condition 2 requires market
clearing. Conditions 1 and 2 alone deﬁne a competitive equilibrium (p;x),
given household structure P, discussed and studied in Haller (2000) and
Gersbach and Haller (2001).
In addition, we impose condition 3 that no individual wants to leave a house-
hold and participate as a one-member household in the market at the going
equilibrium prices. Condition 3 constitutes an individual rationality or vol-
untary participation (membership) constraint. Conditions 1 to 3 together
deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
Conditions 1 to 4 together deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with free
household formation. Condition 4 requires that no individual can leave a
household and can propose a feasible consumption allocation to the members
of a new household, created by the individual and another already existing
household, which makes everybody in the new household better oﬀ at the
going equilibrium prices. Condition 4 still presumes that changes of the
10household structure are the result of individuals leaving a household and
proposing a better allocation to an already existing one- or multi-person
household. Condition 4 already appears in the earlier literature on coali-
tion formation, beginning with Greenberg (1978) and Dr` eze and Greenberg
(1980) who have introduced the concept of individually stable equilibrium
where a coalition partition is individually stable if it is immune to individual
movements which beneﬁt the moving player and do not hurt any member of
the group she joins.5 Finally, our paper is related to the inﬂuential work of
Hirschman (1970) who has considered the comparative eﬃciency of the exit
and voice options as mechanisms of recuperation. In the absence of exter-
nalities, the exit option limits power within households in the sense that a
person cannot achieve higher utility as a multi-member household than as
an individual market participant. This follows from our ﬁrst proposition.
One could think of even stronger conditions in the tradition of the matching
literature (see Roth and Sotomayor 1990 for surveys) where two persons
can break away from two diﬀerent matches and form a new match. But it
has been argued in other contexts, that the divorce threat and thus the exit
option alone describes the behavior of individuals in multi-person households;
see Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) for a summary of this debate. Our
condition 4 lies between these two perspectives on how individuals decide
whether to leave a household. It proves suﬃcient to put the existence of
equilibria with free household formation into question and it is just restrictive
enough to make the normative issue how more outside options aﬀect welfare
an interesting one.
As it is formulated, condition 4 requires that all members must want the
newly formed household g[fig with the proposed commodity allocation. Al-
ternatively, one might require that none of the members of the previous
household g be opposed to forming the new household, i.e. the inequalities
pertaining to j 2 g become weak. The two formulations are equivalent under
many, but not all circumstances.
5Among recent contributions to that literature using a similar condition are Banerjee,
Konishi and S¨ onmez (2001), Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), and Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002). In our work we combine coalition formation, collective decisions and competitive
markets.
114 Equilibrium Welfare
4.1 Ineﬃcacy of Outside Options
We are interested in the individual’s possibilities of achieving higher util-
ity levels by participating in a particular household rather than acting and
trading individually or participating in other households. One might conjec-
ture that particular household members with high bargaining power could
use the household to obtain more consumption. We commence by examin-
ing group formation when there are no externalities (i.e. there is absence of
consumption and group externalities). We establish the following neutrality
theorem.
Proposition 1 (Neutrality Theorem)
Suppose absence of externalities and continuity and local non-satiation of
consumer preferences. Consider (p;x) 2 I R
`£X and any household structure
P. Then the following three assertions are equivalent:
(i) (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free household formation.
(ii) (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
(iii) (p;x) is a traditional competitive equilibrium where each agent acts
and trades individually.
The proof is given in the appendix. Proposition 1 asserts that in the absence
of any externalities, free exit implies that a consumer can fare no better and
no worse as a member of a multi-member household than as an individual
market participant. If, in spite of free exit, some individuals enjoy higher
utility levels as household members than they would obtain individually,
some sort of externality has to be present. Proposition 1 also states that in
the absence of any externalities, the set of competitive equilibria with free
household formation is essentially equal to the set of (traditional) competitive
equilibria when all individuals act and trade individually.
Proposition 1 extends the “Irrelevance Proposition” of Gersbach and Haller
(2001). It conforms with intuition, but still requires a proof and has im-
portant implications for the role of outside options available to individuals
12in households operating in competitive commodity markets. If there are no
externalities, adding more outside options for agents is irrelevant for con-
sumption and utility allocation and hence for welfare. Suppose e.g. that all
multi-person households take their decisions according to a Nash bargaining
solution. Then, Proposition 1 says that it is irrelevant whether such bar-
gaining takes place with outside options of the ﬁrst type (exit) only or with
outside options of both types (exit and possibly joining another consenting
household). Equally important is the observation that adding more outside
options does not impair the stability of households if externalities are ab-
sent. The downside is that household formation becomes pointless under
these circumstances.
The working of the neutrality theorem is now illustrated by an example. In
the example, it is shown that only an equal split of bargaining power be-
tween the members of a two-person household is consistent with a CEFE
or CEFH. Diﬀerent distributions of bargaining power are consistent with a
market equilibrium where the household structure is ﬁxed and exit is not an
option. But those market equilibria violate condition 3 or condition 4 in the
above deﬁnition of CEFE and CEFH. The example follows.
Example 1. Let ` = 2, I = f1;2;3g. Preferences are represented by
Ui(xh;h) = ui(xi) = ui(x1
i;x2
i) where xk
i denotes the quantity of good k


































); w2 = (0;
1
2
); w3 = (1;0):
Commodity prices are normalized so that p1 = 1.
Consider ﬁrst the household structure P 0 = ff1g;f2g;f3gg: It is obvious
























Consider next the household structure P ¤ = ff1;2g;f3gg: Suppose that
household g = f1;2g maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function
Wh = ®U1(x1) + (1 ¡ ®)U2(x2)
= ®lnx1
1 + (1 ¡ ®)lnx2
2; 0 < ® < 1;
subject to the budget constraint x1
1 + p2x2
2 = p2. ® can be interpreted as
the weight of individual 1 in household g. Similarly, 1 ¡ ® is the weight of
individual 2 in household g. The excess demand vectors of the households g






























At prices p¤, individuals i = 1;2 could obtain the following consumption
vectors xs
1 and xs






























2. Similarly (p¤;x¤;P ¤) is a competitive equilibrium
with free household formation if and only if ® = 1
2. ²²
144.2 Optimality of CEFE
The present paper focuses on the interaction of three allocation mechanisms:
group formation, collective decisions within groups and competitive market
exchange between groups. Which allocations qualify as optimal or eﬃcient
depends on how much freedom a social planner is granted in allocating re-
sources and people. If a social planner can allocate both commodities and
consumers, we obtain unconstrained or full Pareto optimality. Accordingly,
an allocation (x;P) is called fully Pareto-optimal or an optimum opti-
morum, if “there is no better one”, i.e. if
(i) (x;P) is feasible and
(ii) there is no feasible allocation (x0;P 0) satisfying
(Ui(x0;P 0))i2I > (Ui(x;P))i2I:
Denote by M¤ the set of fully Pareto-optimal allocations. If all utility func-
tions are continuous in consumption, M¤ is not empty [Gersbach and Haller
(2001)].
It is obvious that competitive equilibrium allocations with free exit need not
be fully Pareto-optimal. Suppose e.g. that there are large gains from form-
ing a two-person household because two individuals, say agent 1 and 2, have
positive pure group externalities. No further externalities are present in the
economy. Moreover, suppose that both agents have the same endowments
and the same consumption preferences. A competitive equilibrium with free
exit can have every person live in a single-person household. This equilib-
rium is, however, Pareto ineﬃcient. Agent 1 and 2 could form a two-person
household with a household excess demand function equal to the sum of indi-
vidual excess demand functions. Hence, equilibrium prices and consumption
allocation would remain as if all persons lived in single-person households.
Hence, agent 1 and 2 would be better oﬀ while all other individuals receive
the same utility. The example suggests that the lack of appropriate outside
options causes ineﬃciency of CEFE. It also suggests that a pair of CEFE can
be Pareto-rankable.6 In the next section we discuss CEFH.
6It is an open question under which circumstances at least one fully Pareto-optimal
equilibrium allocation exists.
154.3 Welfare Implications of Adding JO
We have seen that adding outside options is irrelevant if there are no external-
ities. Now we are going to examine the consequences of adding more outside
options in the presence of externalities. Clearly the additional requirement
can eliminate some of the competitive equilibria with free exit. But which
ones? The good ones, the bad ones, all or none? We shall demonstrate by
means of examples that each of the four conceivable alternatives is indeed
possible.
We have already seen that under the hypothesis of Proposition 1, none of
the equilibria is eliminated. In section 5, we consider examples where all
equilibria are eliminated. In this subsection we demonstrate the other two
possibilities. Let us ﬁrst examine an example that exhibits a pair of weakly
Pareto-rankable competitive equilibria with free exit where the inferior one
is also a competitive equilibrium with free household formation whereas the
superior one is not. Subsequently, we modify the example so that the su-
perior competitive equilibrium with free exit turns out to be a competitive
equilibrium with free household formation while the inferior equilibrium is
eliminated by the additional requirement.
In both examples, the prospect of a tiny surplus share induces a currently sin-
gle person to form a two-person household, leaving most of the surplus to the
new partner. With a population of three people, this leads to the break-up
of any existing two-person household and formation of a new one if the op-
portunity arises, that is if the joining option becomes available. In contrast,
the members of a three-person household have no other household to join
in a population of three people; thus the three-person household remains
unaﬀected by the introduction of the joining option. In the examples one
can suitably alter the household structure associated with a Pareto-superior
competitive equilibrium with free exit by varying (primarily) the per capita
surplus in three-person households.
Example 2. Let I = f1;2;3g and ` = 1. For a household h, let the
endowment be !h = jhj. Let preferences have utility representations of the
form
Ui(xh;h) = a(jhj) ¢ xi
for consumer i in household h where a(1) = 2;a(2) = 8;a(3) = 5. Since
16there is only one good and preferences are strictly monotone, we can set
p = 1. First consider the competitive equilibrium with free exit E1 =
(p;(1;1;1);ff1g;f2;3gg) with utility allocation (2;8;8). Next consider the
CEFE E2 = (p;(0:4;1:3;1:3);fIg) with utility allocation (2;6:5;6:5). Then
E1 weakly Pareto-dominates E2. The inferior equilibrium is also a CEFH,
since there is no other household to join. However, the superior equilibrium
is not a CEFH. Namely individual 2 can propose to consumer 1 to form
household f1;2g with consumption y1 = 1=2; y2 = 3=2 which makes both
better oﬀ. ²²
Example 3. Let again I = f1;2;3g and ` = 1. Modify the previous example
by setting a(1) = 1;a(2) = 8;a(3) = 6. Take E1 as before, now with util-
ity allocation (1;8;8). Set E2 = (p;(1=5;7=5;7=5);fIg) which is an eﬃcient
CEFH, with utility allocation (1:2;8:4;8:4). Here E1 is strictly dominated
by E2 and is not a CEFH. ²²
The preceding examples highlight the ambivalent implications of adding more
outside options for everybody in a society. There exist constellations where
everybody is worse oﬀ. Nevertheless, there are clear circumstances where
adding more outside options is not detrimental to welfare, where in fact
some equilibria with free household formation are fully Pareto-optimal. For
the purpose of describing such a situation, let us call P 2 P an optimal
household structure, if there exists a feasible x such that (x;P) is a fully
Pareto-optimal allocation, i.e. (x;P) 2 M¤. Then we obtain:
Proposition 2 Suppose pure group externalities, that is
Ui(xh;h) = Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h) for xh 2 Xh;h 2 Hi;i 2 I. If
(i) (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy
represented by (Uc
i ;!fig)i2I, where all Uc
i ;i 2 I, satisfy local non-
satiation, and
(ii) P is the unique optimal household structure based solely on group
preferences represented by U
g
i ;i 2 I,
then the allocation (x;P) is fully Pareto-optimal and the state (p;x;P) is a
CEFH.
17The proof is given in the appendix. Proposition 2 means that free household
formation will never destroy all Pareto-optimal allocations if there is a sin-
gle optimal household structure based on group preferences alone. In that
case, the equilibrium condition 4 of CEFH tends to eliminate some ineﬃ-
cient equilibria associated with ineﬃcient household structures. The latter
occurs in the following example: Adding the second type of outside options
leads to the reshuﬄing of an ineﬃcient household structure that can prevail
as long as only the ﬁrst type of outside options is available to individuals.
Once the joining option becomes available as well, one individual joins an-
other household which leads to the establishment of the optimal household
structure.
Example 4. Let I = f1;2;3g and ` = 1. For a household h, the endowment
is wh = jhj. Preferences are represented by utility functions Ui;i 2 I, and
given as follows:
Ui(xh;h) = xi + k if h = f1;2g
Ui(xh;h) = xi ¡ k if jhj = 3
Ui(xh;h) = xi otherwise
The group externalities satisfy 1 > k > 0. Since there is only one commodity,
we can set p = 1. Note that there exists a uniquely determined optimal
household structure P ¤ = ff1;2g;f3gg, based on pure group preferences
alone. However, there also exists the CEFE
E
1 = (p;(1;1;1);ff1;3g;2g)
with a diﬀerent household structure and utility allocation (1;1;1). The re-
spective equilibrium allocation is, for instance, dominated by the fully Pareto-
optimal allocation
((1 ¡ k=2;1 ¡ k=2;1 + k);ff1;2g;f3gg)
with utility allocation (1+k=2;1+1=2;1+k). Moreover, E1 is not a CEFH
since the ﬁrst and second individual could form a new household providing
higher utility for both. Indeed, it is obvious that any allocation (x;P) with
P 6= P ¤ cannot be a competitive equilibrium allocation with free household
formation. ²²
185 Existence with EO
In this section we establish the existence of competitive equilibria with free
exit. For that purpose, we denote by P 0 = ff1g;:::;fngg the household
structure where all households are singletons and formulate a ﬁrst equilibrium
existence theorem.
Proposition 3 (Trivial Equilibria) Suppose for all i 2 I:
(i) !i À 0.
(ii) Ui(xi;fig) is continuous, strictly monotone and concave in xi.
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit of the form (p;x;P 0).
proof. As an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 in Gersbach and
Haller (1999) or as a corollary of the proof of Proposition 4 given in the ap-
pendix, we obtain existence of a price system p and an allocation x so that
conditions 1 and 2 for a competitive equilibrium with free exit are satisﬁed.
We need not check condition 3, since all individuals are already in one-person
households which renders the exit option irrelevant. Q.E.D.
The proposition asserts the existence of trivial competitive equilibria with
exit where everybody is single and is not exposed to externalities. We also
know that under the provisions of the neutrality theorem, any household
structure qualiﬁes as equilibrium household structure, provided there is an
equilibrium. Otherwise, for multi-member households to exist in equilibrium,
there ought to be some incentive for multi-member household formation,
some advantage from living in a larger household that prevents its members
from leaving.
A priori, a large group or, to be precise, a non-single household h oﬀers an
advantage to its members if at any given price system, the group can af-
ford consumption plans for its members that make each member better oﬀ
than the member’s optimal choice as a single consumer — which is captured
by inequalities of the form (3) below. If preferences are assumed convex
and continuous in household consumption, then under certain additional as-
sumptions, Debreu’s (1952) social equilibrium approach to the equilibrium
19existence problem proves most suitable.7 Essentially it suﬃces to assume
that every member i of multi-member household h prefers the consumption
plan xh = (xj)j2h for the household to consuming the individual component
xi of xh as a single person. But one crucial step in the social equilibrium
approach is the restriction to truncated budget sets. This technicality makes
the formal deﬁnition of the Large Group Advantage (LGA) condition below
more complicated and elaborate, since one has to make sure that the inequal-
ities (3) can be met even if household h is restricted to a truncated budget
set. Formally, this requirement is captured by the following conditions 1-3.
To this end, we restrict prices to the price simplex
∆ =
(









We denote the relative interior of ∆ by ∆o. Further let us choose k > 0 so that
the social endowment !S belongs to the cube Q = [0;k]`: Set K = [0;2k]`:
(LGA) Large Group Advantage: We say that a multi-member household
h has large group advantage, if:
1. Every member i 2 h has a demand function x0
i(¢), where x0
i(p) denotes
the demand of consumer i when trading individually from the endow-
ment !fig at prices p 2 ∆o.
2. For every price system p 2 ∆, there exists a non-empty, compact and
convex set Xh(p) µ Bh(p) \ Kh which depends continuously on p.
3. For all p 2 ∆o and xh 2 Bh(p) \ Kh: xh 2 Xh(p) iﬀ
Ui(xh;h) ¡ Ui(x
0
i(p);fig) ¸ ±i(p) (3)
with some threshold ±i(p) ¸ 0 holds for all i 2 h.
To illustrate that the key condition 3 of LGA is non-vacuous, let us present
two alternative assumptions on a multi-member household h that will yield
7We shall elaborate later on an alternative approach relying on the “excess demand
lemma” which proves successful under diﬀerent assumptions, including speciﬁc positive
externalities of the separable type within household h. Without separability and purely
positive externalities, the social equilibrium approach of Debreu is more promising.
20condition 3 when supplemented with suitable further assumptions: (i) Suﬃ-
ciently bounded individual demands so that (x0
i(p))i2h 2 Bh(p)\Kh. An ex-
ample is given by the utility representation Ui(xi;fig)=minfxk
ijk =1;:::;`g.
(ii) Group preferences which strictly dominate consumption preferences, e.g.
Ui(¢;h) ¸ 0 and Ui(¢;fig) < 0 for i 2 h. In this case, (3) becomes trivial.




The somewhat extreme cases (i) and (ii) have the virtue of being simple and
transparent. In the appendix we show:
Proposition 4 (Non-Trivial Equilibria) Suppose:
(i) !h À 0 for all h 2 H.
(ii) Ui(xh;h) is continuous and concave for all i 2 h;h 2 H.
(iii) Ui(xi;fig) is strictly monotone for all i 2 I.
(iv) There exist a household h 2 H with 1 < jhj < n, which has large group
advantage (LGA), and a member j 2 h whose preferences are strictly
monotonic in own consumption and who is not imposing any negative
consumption externalities on other household members.
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit of the form (p;x;P)
with P 6= P 0. More speciﬁcally, h 2 P for some h satisfying (iv).
The proposition basically states that as soon as two or more agents can gain
from living together in a household, non-trivial equilibria with free exit and
a multi-member household exist. Needless to say that one can also impose
conditions so that only small groups are viable in an equilibrium with free
exit.
As mentioned in footnote 7, with diﬀerent assumptions an approach relying
on the “excess demand lemma” proves successful. Speciﬁcally, one makes
certain standard assumptions (including strict concavity of the functions
Ui(¢ ;fig)) in combination with particular positive externalities of the sepa-
rable type within household h. Two special cases of the latter are positive
pure group externalities [PGE restricted to household h] on the one hand
and positive separable pure consumption externalites [SEP of Haller (2000)
restricted to household h] on the other hand. The proof is similar to that of
Proposition 3 in Gersbach and Haller (1999).
216 Existence with EO and JO
In this section we take up the challenging question whether and under which
circumstances competitive equilibria with free household formation exist. We
start with the observation that Proposition 2 lends itself to an existence
result.
Proposition 5 Suppose pure group externalities, that is
Ui(xh;h) = Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h) for xh 2 Xh;h 2 Hi;i 2 I. If
(i) !S À 0, each of the functions Uc
i ;i 2 I, is continuous, strictly in-
creasing and strictly quasi-concave, and
(ii) P is the unique optimal household structure based solely on group
preferences represented by U
g
i ;i 2 I,
then a fully Pareto-optimal CEFH exists.
proof. By Proposition 17.C.1 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), there exists a
competitive equilibrium (p;x) of the pure exchange economy represented by
(Uc
i ;!fig)i2I if (i) holds. By Proposition 2 above, the allocation (x;P) is fully
Pareto-optimal and the state (p;x;P) is a CEFH if (i) and (ii) hold. Q.E.D.
Next we make the important observation that there are constellations where
competitive equilibria with free household formation need not exist, where
all conceivable household structures are destabilized by outside options of
the second type (JO). Therein lies the challenge.
6.1 Non-Existence of Equilibria with Free Household
Formation: An Example
We are going to present an example that exhibits pure group externalities.
There is also a single consumption good. Consequently, in equilibrium no
trade occurs across households, but utility can be (imperfectly) transferred
between members of the same household. For each household, one can de-
termine the feasible utility allocations for its members. Hence by varying
22the consumptive utility function u and the group externality parameters k
and ² of the example, one can generate an entire family of hedonic coalition
games in the sense of Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980). A transferable utility
game results if (and only if) u is aﬃne linear.
In the speciﬁc four-person example, surplus comparisons reveal that house-
holds of any size are unstable. A four-person household is unstable because
it generates negative surplus and at least one of its members can fare bet-
ter going single. A three-person household is unstable, since at least one
member can beneﬁt from forming a two-person household with the currently
single individual and appropriate most of the surplus. This is possible be-
cause in a two-person household, the maximum per capita surplus is not
much less than in a three-person household. But two coexisting two-person
households do not constitute a stable conﬁguration either, since at least one
person will have an incentive to switch households. This is the case because
every three-person household includes at least one person with a preference
for three-person households so that the maximum per capita surplus in such
a household exceeds the maximum per capita surplus in a two-person house-
hold. Finally, two singles can always beneﬁt from forming a two-person
household. Thus a household proves unstable regardless of size.
Example 5. Let I = f1;2;3;4g and ` = 1. For a household h, the endow-
ment is wh = jhj. Preferences are represented by utility functions Ui;i 2 I,
and given as follows:
Ui(xh;h) = u(xi) if h = fig (4)
Ui(xh;h) = u(xi) + k if jhj = 2 (5)
Ui(xh;h) = u(xi) + k if jhj = 3; i = 1;2 (6)
Ui(xh;h) = u(xi) + k + " if jhj = 3; i = 3;4 (7)
Ui(xh;h) = u(xi) ¡ k if jhj = 4 (8)
The group externalities satisfy k > 0 and k ¸ " ¸ 0. The function u is
continuous and strictly increasing. It satisﬁes u(1) ¸ u(0) + k. Since there
is only one good, we can set p = 1.
We ﬁrst consider the case " = 0. Then, there exists a CEFH, namely
E
1 = (p;(1;1;1;1); ff1;2g;f3;4gg)
23with utility allocation (u(1) + k;u(1) + k;u(1) + k;u(1) + k): Since the pop-
ulation is homogeneous, there exist two other equilibria with the same utility
allocation and household structures ff1;3g;f2;4gg and ff1;4g;f2;3gg, re-
spectively. No other equilibria with free household formation exist. For
instance, the household structure ff1;2;3g;4g cannot be part of an equilib-
rium, since at least one individual in the household f1;2;3g can propose to
agent i = 4 to form a two-person household which makes both individuals
better oﬀ. Speciﬁcally, the individual leaving f1;2;3g can oﬀer i = 4 a con-
sumption level u¡1(u(1) ¡ k + ±) for some small ±, k > ± > 0. Agent 4’s
utility will be u(1)+± and therefore larger than in the candidate equilibrium.
The deviating agent obtains a utility
u(2 ¡ u
¡1(u(1) ¡ k + ±)) + k
which exceeds the utility of at least one member in the household f1;2;3g
since ± < k.
Next let us consider the case " > 0 where " is suﬃciently small. We claim that
no CEFH exists. Consider ﬁrst the candidate equilibrium E1. Individual 2
could join f3;4g by proposing the household allocation:
xg = (x2;x3;x4) = (3 ¡ 2u
¡1(u(1) ¡ ");u
¡1(u(1) ¡ ");u
¡1(u(1) ¡ ")) (9)
which yields the utility allocation
(u(3 ¡ 2u
¡1(u(1) ¡ ")) + k;u(1) + k;u(1) + k) (10)
and makes agent 2 better oﬀ while the utility of individuals 3 and 4 remains
constant. Hence, E1 cannot be a CEFH. A similar argument applies mutatis
mutandis for any other household structure with two two-person households.
Furthermore, by essentially the same agument as before, no CEFH can ex-
ist with a three-person or four-person household. Finally, if everybody were
alone, two persons could form a household and both be better oﬀ. Therefore,
no CEFH exists. ²²
The interesting feature of the example is that a small change of the exter-
nalities destroys the existence of a competitive equilibrium with free house-
hold formation. It is obvious that the existence problem in the example
24can be overcome by taking a speciﬁc number of replica of the original econ-
omy. In the example three replica would allow all individuals preferring a
three-person household over a two-person household to be member of a three-
person household while other individuals could live in two-person households.
Later, however, we will see that enlarging the economy through replication
cannot restore existence under all circumstances.
6.2 Existence with One Commodity
Having established the possibility of non-existence, we next identify circum-
stances in which a competitive equilibrium with free household formation
exists. We ﬁrst provide several simple existence results when trade of con-
sumption goods does not matter, because there is only one commodity. Sub-
sequently, the more challenging case of more than one commodity is consid-
ered.
6.2.1 Hedonic Coalitions
If there is only one commodity, the model resembles a game with “hedonic
coalitions” ` a la Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980) where trade and transfers among
coalitions are prohibited. Their concept of individually stable equilibrium
(i.s.e.) is slighty stronger than our notion of competitive equilibrium with
free household formation (CEFH). Their Example 3.1 and our Examples 5
and 6 are all instances of non-existence of a CEFH (and by implication, an
i.s.e.).
The construction of Examples 1 and 2 generalizes and yields a ﬁrst immediate
existence result for CEFH. Let I = f1;:::;ng and ` = 1. Further, let
preferences have utility representations of the form
Ui(xh;h) = A(h) ¢ xi (11)
for consumer i in household h where the externality coeﬃcient A(h) > 0
represents a multiplicatively separable group externality within household h
— which is ordinally equivalent to a pure group externality. One obtains as
an immediate result:
25Proposition 6 If P is a household structure such that




for all h 2 P, then there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit with
household structure P. If in particular, the inequality holds for h = I, then
there exists a competitive equilibrium with free household formation where the
household I is formed.
6.2.2 Two-sided Matching
Next we deal with the existence of competitive equilibria with free house-
hold formation in the marriage market. The marriage market has been a
prominent application of the two-sided matching approach [see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)]. Gale and Shapley (1962) have shown in their seminal
paper that there always exists a stable matching for any marriage market.
Many subsequent contributions have demonstrated the robustness of this
classic result. We have already pointed out that condition 4 in our deﬁni-
tion of a competitive equilibrium with free household formation (CEFE) is
weaker than the stability condition in the matching literature [see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)] which requires that a matching be not blocked by any
individual or pair of agents forming a new match. Therefore, this literature
promises to provide further existence results in our context. Indeed, the exis-
tence results carry over from the matching literature to our framework when
there is only one commodity.
To state such a result in our context we consider a simple marriage market
as follows. We suppose ` = 1 and that the population is divided into two
non-empty, ﬁnite and disjoint sets, M and F: M = fm1;:::;mmg is the set
of men, and F = ff1;:::;fng is the set of women. We assume that each
individual has some endowments, !i > 0 and !j > 0, respectively. The
preferences of men are given by
Ui(xh;h) = xi if h = fmig (12)
Ui(xh;h) = xi + gij if h = fmi;fjg (13)
Ui(xh;h) = xi ¡ ¯ g in all other cases (14)
We assume ¯ g > 0 and 0 · gij · !i for any potential couple fmi;fjg. The
26preferences of women are deﬁned accordingly. We call such preferences pure
group externalities of the matching type.
Such a marriage market where utility can be freely transferred within a house-
hold by an appropriate allocation of commodities and no trade through mar-
kets occurs, can be viewed as a generalized assignment game. We obtain:
Proposition 7 Suppose ` = 1 and pure group externalities of the matching
type. Then a competitive equilibrium with free household formation exists.
proof. Because of the exit condition 3 and ¯ g > 0, we only have to consider
single person households or matches between a man and a woman as potential
households in a CEFH. Since our free household formation condition 4 is
weaker than the stability condition in the matching literature we can rely on
the existence proofs for the generalizations and variations of the assignment
model provided by Shapley and Shubik (1972), Quinzii (1984), Gale (1984)
and Alkan and Gale (1990); see also Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
Let us check the essential assumptions as they are formulated in Alkan and
Gale (1990), for example. Let us hypothetically extend the domain of Ui to
negative consumption – which will not occur in equilibrium. Then the range
of the utility function is all of I R, since Ui(xi) is unbounded above and below.
Moreover, for any couple, the corresponding Pareto-frontier in utility space
is linear. Hence, we can apply Theorem 1 of Alkan and Gale (1990) which
establishes existence of a core payoﬀ and, consequently, of a CEFH. Q.E.D.
6.3 Non-Existence in the Marriage Market
When investigating the stable matching problem in our framework, where
not only individuals are matched through the market but also commodities
are traded and collective household decisions are taken, one encounters a
number of new problems.
We have seen that the existence results of the matching literature are ap-
plicable in our framework provided that there is only one commodity. With
several commodities, however, households may actively trade in the market.
Consequently, what is feasible for a household depends on market prices.
This price-dependence tends to undermine existence, even if households are
restricted to singles and heterosexual marriages. Although our equilibrium
27conditions 3 and 4 are weaker than the standard stability condition for the
marriage market, the existence result for the special case ` = 1 does not carry
over to the multiple goods case as the following example demonstrates. In
the three-person example, externalities are conﬁned to the one female indi-
vidual whom we shall call Anita. She experiences a positive group externality
and a negative consumption externality (with respect to the second good)
when living with a partner. For any constant consumption of the partner,
the consumption externality becomes less severe as Anita’s consumption of
the second good increases.
If everyone is single, the market clearing price of the second good happens
to be low. Then at the going prices, Anita can aﬀord enough own consump-
tion of the second good so that the positive group externality dominates
and she and another individual can both beneﬁt from forming a two-person
household. Now suppose Anita belongs to a two-person household with one
single person remaining. Then the market is cleared at a high relative price
of the second good. Therefore, as Anita can aﬀord too little consumption
of the second good, the negative consumption externality dominates, and
she is better oﬀ alone. Hence for any given household structure, the market
clearing prices are such that Anita can beneﬁt from a change of household.
Example 6. Let ` = 2 and I = f1;2;3g where the ﬁrst two individuals are
male and i = 3 is Anita, the only female. The individual endowments are
given by:
w1 = (0;1);w2 = (0;1);w3 = (1;1):




1; if h = f1g;f1;3g;
U2(xh;h) = lnx
2
2; if h = f2g;f2;3g;
U3(xh;h) = ®lnx
1
3 + (1 ¡ ®)lnx
2
3; if h = f3g;
U3(xh;h) = ®lnx
1




ig) + g; if h = f3;ig;i = 1;2:
where 0 < ® < 1, x
j
i denotes the quantity of good j (j = 1;2) consumed by
individual i, and we adhere to the convention ln0 = ¡1.
Living in a two-person household with partner i = 1 or partner i = 2 pro-
vides the third individual with a positive group externality (g > 0). She
28suﬀers, however, from a negative consumption externality (1 > k > 0). We
further assume that living in a three-person household or in h = f1;2g cre-
ates enormous negative group externalities and will never be chosen. Hence
our model is of the matching type where the only conceivable household
structures consist of single-person and two-person households.
Commodity prices are normalized so that p1 = 1. Consider ﬁrst the house-
hold structure P ± = ff1g;f2g;f3gg. It is obvious that there exists a unique


















3 = (1 ¡ ®)(1 + p2)=p2:
Therefore market clearing, x2
3 = 1, yields p0
2 = 1¡®
® . At the going equilibrium
prices i = 3 could propose to i = 1 to form the household h = f1;3g by of-
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3 = (1 ¡ ®)(1 + p0
2)=p0
2 + ®k = 1 + ®k; (15)
ˆ x
1
3 = 1 + p0
2 ¡ p0
2x2
3 = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)k (16)
which yields utility
U3(ˆ xh;h) = ®ln(1¡(1¡®)k)+(1¡®)ln(1¡(1¡®)k)+g = ln(1¡(1¡®)k)+g:
Suppose that we choose parameters (k;g) such that
ln(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)k) + g > 0:
29Then (p0;x0;P
±) is not a competitive equilibrium with free household for-
mation because h = f1;3g will be formed at equilibrium prices.
Consider next the household structure P ¤ = ff1;3g;f2gg. Consider house-
hold h = f1;3g. The maximal utility the third individual can achieve, subject
to 1’s outside options, is attained when individual i = 1 consumes one unit
of the second commodity. The remaining problem of individual 3 is as in the
case before. Therefore we obtain the demand for the second commodity as
x
2
3 = (1 ¡ ®)(1 + p2)=p2 + ®k:
But to be in equilibrium now, markets must clear again. Hence x1
3 = 1, x2
3 = 1
which requires equilibrium prices p¤
2 = 1¡®
®(1¡k). The utility of individual 3 is
U3(x
¤
h;h) = (1 ¡ ®)ln(1 ¡ k) + g:
Since there exist values of ® such that
ln(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)k) > (1 ¡ ®)ln(1 ¡ k);
e.g. ® = 1
2, we can ﬁx such an ® and choose parameter constellations (k;g)
such that
U3(ˆ xh;h) > 0 > U3(x
¤
h;h):
Since individual 3 can always achieve utility U3 = 0 by living as a one-
person household and consuming her endowments, we conclude that under
the suitably chosen parameter constellation (p¤;x¤;P ¤) is not a competitive
equilibrium with free household formation: agent 3 prefers to be single at
the going market prices. However, we have established before that agent 3
prefers to form a two-person household at the market prices which would
obtain if everybody were single. Since individuals 1 and 2 are completely
interchangeable, we conclude that no CEFH exists. ²²
This example shows that active trade across households poses a challenge
with regard to existence of stable outcomes not only for us, but also for
the traditional matching literature. The hypotheses of the example and of
Proposition 7 diﬀer in two respects. First, there are several commodities.
Second, there are no longer pure group externalities of the matching type.
This begs the question whether existence of a CEFH can be obtained, if
there are several commodities, but pure group externalities of the matching
30type prevail. In the most general form of the latter case, the population is
partitioned into men and women; preferences are represented by Ui(xh;h) =
Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h) such that based on the group preferences given by U
g
i alone,
individual i strictly prefers staying single or forming a two-person household
with a member of the opposite sex (“marriage”) to any other household.
Under these circumstances, the following proposition holds whose proof is
straightforward.
Proposition 8 Suppose the general case of pure group externalities of the
matching type. If
(i) (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy rep-
resented by (Uc
i ;wfig)i2I and
(ii) P is a stable matching with respect to pure group preferences,
then the state (p;x;P) is a CEFE.
According to the classical result of Gale and Shapley (1962), condition (ii)
can always be satisﬁed. Under standard assumptions on consumer charac-
teristics, condition (i) holds as well and, consequently, a CEFE with stable
matching exists. Mohemkar-Kheirandish (2001) shows, among other things,
that under additional assumptions a CEFE of the form described in the
proposition is also a CEFH. He assumes each Uc
i concave, strictly mono-
tone and continuously diﬀerentiable on I R
`
++ so that the ﬁrst order approach
applies; each wfig strictly positive; all males of the same type with strict
preference for marriage; all females of the same type with strict preference
for marriage; an equal number of males and females. Needless to say that a
CEFE of the form suggested by Proposition 8 happens to be a CEFH, if the
assumptions of Proposition 1 hold. Furthermore, such a CEFE turns out to
be a CEFH whenever the strong assumption (ii) of Proposition 2 holds.
However, in general a CEFE of the form described in the last proposition
need not be a CEFH. To see this, it suﬃces to consider a population consist-
ing of one male and one female, where the male has a slight preference (in
terms of the utility diﬀerence) for staying single and the female has a strong
preference for being married. Let the corresponding (absolute) utility diﬀer-
entials be ² for the male and ∆ for the female. Then the stable matching
31with respect to pure group preferences requires both to remain single. Now
suppose they have identical and strictly positive endowments and identical
consumption preferences of the Cobb-Douglas type. Then the competitive
equilibrium in (i) is a no trade equilibrium. If ² is suﬃciently small and
∆ is suﬃciently large, they can both beneﬁt from getting married and shift-
ing some consumption from the female to the male — which shows our claim.
Additional examples of non-existence appear in the literature on hedonic
coalitions and matching. Example 4 of Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002),
the example of Alkan (1988) and the roommate example of Gale and Shapley
(1962) all constitute purely hedonic cases that diﬀer from marriage models.
Our Example 5 does not belong to the marriage category either. It shares
features of matching and assignment games due to the presence of a con-
sumption good and pure group externalities. Our Example 6 is reminiscent
of Example 3.3 in Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980), despite the fact that the lat-
ter is not a marriage model. Their common feature consists in the interaction
of household formation and commodity allocation. The striking feature of
Dr` eze and Greenberg’s example is the absence of externalities. It is driven by
household-speciﬁc (coalition-speciﬁc) endowments wh with wh 6=
P
i2h wfig
for some households h.
6.4 Discussion
Non-existence of a competitive equilibrium with certain properties renders
the discussion of equilibrium household structures and equilibrium welfare
obsolete. There are several possible responses to the non-existence problem.
First, the model might be misspeciﬁed. For instance, the modeling might be
too parsimonious. While household stability cannot be achieved on purely
economic grounds, given the two types of outside options depicted here, a
full account of all the forces that stabilize – or destabilize – households might
restore equilibrium.8 Furthermore, the market for marriages may be more
competitive than reﬂected in our equilibrium concept.
Second, one might suspect that price-taking is too restrictive. If only con-
8For example, household-speciﬁc human capital can serve as a bond among household
members, as a referee has pointed out.
32sumers could freely recontract without regard to market prices, then the
economy would settle in an equilibrium state in the sense of Edgeworth,
that is a core allocation. Indeed, the full core which allows for the realloca-
tion of consumers and commodities, happens to be non-empty in Example 6.
However, Gersbach and Haller (1999) contains a three-person example where
gender does not matter and the full core turns out to be empty.
Third, non-existence of equilibrium may capture an important feature of re-
ality. Let us recapitulate the essence of Example 6. Individuals may ﬁnd it
optimal to split at the going market prices in order to reduce negative con-
sumption externalities. But at equilibrium prices of the changed household
structure, individuals may ﬁnd it optimal to form a two-person household
in order to beneﬁt from group externalities, because they can buy more of
those goods which generate less consumption externalities. The marital sta-
tus of the woman in the example aﬀects her market opportunities and vice
versa. Therefore, the woman may simply go through a sequence of marriage,
divorce, marriage, divorce, etc., which constitutes an example of sequential
monogamy, possibly with breaks. A dynamic approach suggests itself for
future analysis.
Finally, non-existence may simply be a small number or integer problem
that goes away when the population is large enough. For instance, non-
existence in Example 5 disappears after suitable replication. Insofar, non-
existence may be considered merely an artifact of the particular example.
However, the problem is more intricate. Non-existence in Example 6 does
not vanish under replication, not even asymptotically. The reason is that
sizeable (relative to the economy) groups of consumers of the same type keep
moving simultaneously into or out of households. To end on a positive note,
suﬃcient dispersion of consumer characteristics will restore existence. If each
agent is replaced not by identical clones, but by similar yet non-identical
copies, then at certain prices, some of the females may wish to remain single
while others may wish to stay in two-person households and, consequently,
the household structure may end up to be stable. This certainly works in
Example 6. This is not to say that existence would never become a problem
if only consumer characteristics were well dispersed.
337 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a general equilibrium model where households
operate in a competitive market environment, can have several members and
make eﬃcient collective consumption decisions. Our main concern has been
the impact (on household stability and equilibrium eﬃciency) of introducing
outside options. Our approach diﬀers from partial equilibrium analyses which
has produced countless theoretical and empirical studies of household related
issues, involving numerous economic sub-disciplines and touching upon topics
as diverse as fertility, mortality, demography, population dynamics, marriage
and matching, status, income, poverty, nutrition, health, public transfers,
education, social capital, human capital, employment, development, welfare,
demand and supply, and so forth. Each of the sub-disciplines has developed
its own rich body of theories and accumulated a host of empirical work. We
think that applications of our model might provide a complimentary general
equilibrium perspective on these issues.
Moreover, suitable extensions of the basic framework might address further
pertinent issues that arose during the course of our analysis which we shall
brieﬂy revisit. While the current investigation is devoted to the allocative
consequences of eﬃcient decisions at the household level, an inquiry into the
allocative consequences of ineﬃcient household decisions could be fruitful
as well. Suppose some households are making mistakes by the standards of
collective rationality. Then one might address the causes of these mistakes or
study their allocative consequences. For some thoughts related to the second
issue we refer to the preliminary research on general equilibrium models with
ineﬃcient households in Gersbach and Haller (2002).
Public policy issues in a variety of areas might be addressed within the current
framework. We provide three examples. The ﬁrst area consists of policies
that directly aﬀect outside options. For instance, laws governing the right to
divorce, child support and marital property upon divorce inﬂuence directly
the attractiveness of exercising outside options. Suppose future research
shows that, as a rule, granting more outside options to individuals promotes
social eﬃciency. Then divorce-related property rights should not depend
on the presence of other adults in the new households of the ex-spouses.
However, some of our examples suggest that the joining option tends to
destabilize households and to eliminate superior equilibria. If these negative
eﬀects turn out to be the rule, then taking the joining option should possibly
34be discouraged, for instance by granting less generous property rights to those
who exercise it.
The second area comprises policies that inﬂuence consumption externalities.
For instance, taxes that can aﬀect consumption externalities may also aﬀect
the stability of households. Consider a two-person household which is formed
because of positive group externalities. But one non-smoking member suﬀers
from negative consumption externalities, because the partner is smoking.
A suﬃciently large cigarette tax reduces smoking and, depending on the
elasticity of cigarette demand, may increase or reduce consumption of the
remaining goods in the household. In the former case, a cigarette tax can
enhance the stability of the particular household — which might serve as an
additional argument in support of such a “sin tax”. In the latter case, the
non-smoker might prefer to leave the household. Thus a heavy “sin tax” may
also destabilize certain households.
The last category includes taxes and transfers to and from households and
their members. Consider for instance the case of female labor supply. A
sizeable fraction of women do not work outside of their home when living with
partners, but presumably would go to work if they were single — unless they
went on welfare instead. Whether or not such corner solutions occur depends
among other things on household decisions regarding care for children but
very likely also on how a second household income is treated with respect to
taxation and transfers. High marginal tax rates on second household incomes
occur naturally when taxation is progressive, only total household income is
taxed and tax codes do not distinguish between multi-person and single-
person households. Such tax systems tend to promote the aforementioned
corner solutions. They may also make the exit option excessively attractive,
conceivably with undesirable consequences. Hence they can inﬂuence both
the allocation of resources and the composition of households.
The policy questions have no straightforward answers. A general equilib-
rium approach helps capture relevant aggregate eﬀects and spillovers across
households and markets.
358 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Step 1:
We show that (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit if and only if
(p;x;P 0) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit where P 0 = ffig : i 2 Ig.
Suppose now that (p;x;P 0) is a CEFE. Recall that absence of externalities
and local non-satiation is assumed. Hence, by the ﬁrst welfare theorem, x is
Pareto-optimal — regardless of the household structure. We claim that
xh 2 EBh(p) for any potential household h: (17)
Clearly, pxi · p!i for all i, hence p ¤ xh · p!h, i.e. xh 2 Bh(p) for all
potential households h. Suppose xh 62 EBh(p) for some h. Then there exists
yh 2 Bh(p) with
Ui(yi) ¸ Ui(xi) for all i 2 h;
Uj(yj) > Uj(xj) for some j 2 h:
Equilibrium and local non-satiation imply
pyi ¸ p!i for all i 2 h;
pyj > p!j for some j 2 h:
Hence p ¤ yh > p!h, contradicting yh 2 Bh(p). Therefore, (17) has to hold
which implies the ﬁrst condition of a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
Further observe that the second and third deﬁning conditions of a compet-
itive equilibrium with free exit are trivially met here. Hence (p;x;P) is a
CEFE.
Suppose next that (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit. Be-
cause of local non-satiation, p À 0. Because of continuity, we can then
choose for each i 2 I a utility maximizer x0
i in Bfig(p), pertaining to the
event that consumer i is acting individually and trading from his endowment
!i at prices p. Since (p;x;P) is a CEFE,
Ui(xi) ¸ Ui(x
0




i) for all i 2 I: (18)
36Suppose not. Then there exists a household h 2 P such that
Ui(xi) ¸ Ui(x
0
i) for all i 2 h;
Uj(xj) > Uj(x
0
j) for some j 2 h:
Hence, some individuals j 2 h cannot aﬀord xj when trading from !j at
prices p. Hence, p ¢ xj > p ¢ !j. For all individuals i we have p ¢ xi ¸ p ¢ !i.
Summing up all individual budget constraints yields














A = p ¢ !h
which, however, violates the budget constraint of household h. Hence, Ui(xi) =
Ui(x0
i), i 2 I. Because of local non-satiation, (18) implies
pxi ¸ px
0
i = p!i for all individuals i:
We further claim that
xi 2 Bfig(p) for all i 2 I: (19)
Suppose not. Then there exists a household h 2 P such that
pxi ¸ p!i for all i 2 h;
pxj > p!j for some j 2 h;
leading once more to a violation of the household’s budget constraint. Hence
(19) must hold. (18) and (19) imply that (p;x;P 0) is a CEFE.
Step 2:
We show that if (p;x;P 0) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit where
P 0 = ffig : i 2 Ig, then for any P 2 P, (p;x;P) is also a competitive
equilibrium with free household formation.
Now let (p;x;P 0) be a CEFE and P be any feasible household structure.
Because of the absence of externalities and local non-satiation, the ﬁrst wel-
fare theorem applies and x is Pareto-optimal regardless of the household
structure. From step 1 we know that (p;x;P) is a CEFE and
xh 2 EBh(p) for any potential household h: (20)
37We want to show that (p;x;P) is also a CEFH. Suppose not. Hence, there
exist two households g and h in P and i 2 h and a consumption allocation
yg[fig in Bg[fig(p) such that
Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) and
Uj(yj) ¸ Uj(xj) for all j 2 g.
Local non-satiation implies
pyi > p!i = pxi and
pyj ¸ p!j = pxj for all j 2 g.
Hence, individual i cannot aﬀord yi when trading from !i at prices p. For all
individuals j 2 g we have p ¢ xj ¸ p ¢ !j. Summing up all individual budget
constraints yields
p ¤ yg[fig = p ¢ yi + p ¢
X
j2g
xj > p ¢ !i + p ¢
X
j2g
!j = p ¢ !g + p ¢ !i
which, however, violates the budget constraint of household g [ fig.
Hence, we obtain a contradiction unless (p;x;P) is a CEFH. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Suppose the state (p;x;P) satisﬁes (i) and (ii). For i 2 I, let P(i) denote the
corresponding element of P, i.e. the household to which i belongs. We ﬁrst
claim that there do not exist any i 2 I and h 2 Hi with U
g
i (h) > U
g
i (P(i)).
For otherwise, there would exist an optimal household structure based solely
on group preferences, P ¤ such that U
g
i (P ¤(i)) ¸ U
g
i (h) > U
g
i (P(i)) and,
therefore, P ¤ 6= P, contradicting (ii). Moreover, we observe that x is a
Pareto-optimal allocation of the pure exchange economy (Uc
i ;!fig)i2I because
consumers are locally non-satiated.
Consider now any feasible allocation (y;P 0) and i 2 I. Suppose
Ui(yP0(i);P 0(i)) > Ui(xP(i);P(i)). Then we claim that Uj(yP0(j);P 0(j)) <
Uj(xP(j);P(j)) for some j 2 I. From above we have U
g




i (yi) > Uc
i (xi). This implies Uc
j(yj) < Uc
j(xj) for some j 2 I, since
x is a Pareto-optimal consumption allocation of the pure exchange economy
(Uc
i ;!fig)i2I. Further U
g
j (P 0(j)) · U
g
j (P(j)). Hence the claim follows. This
shows that the allocation (x;P) is fully Pareto-optimal.
Next we prove that the state (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free
household formation. Suppose not. Hence, there exist a household h 2 P and
an individual i 2 h such that either i is better oﬀ as a single or there exists
a household g 2 P which i can join and where the utility of all members of
the newly created household g [ fig can be improved. We concentrate on
the latter case. The case when individual i forms a one-person household is
similar.
Let yg[fig 2 Bg[fig(p) be an allocation in the newly created household g[fig
which makes everybody in this household better oﬀ. Since U
g





j(xj) has to hold for each j 2 g [ fig. But since (p;x)
is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy (Uc
i ;!fig)i2I, we
have pyj > p!j for all j 2 g [ fig. Therefore, p ¤ yg[fig > p ¢ !g[fig, contra-
dicting yg[fig 2 Bg[fig(p). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We start from the proof of Proposition 1 in Gersbach and Haller (1999)
and introduce exit options. By (iv), we can choose a potential household
h 2 H with 1 < jhj < n and large group advantage. Let us choose such a
household h and corresponding ±i(p);(i;p) 2 h£∆0, and Xh(p);p 2 ∆, with





fig : i 62 h
o
:
We claim that there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit (p;x;P).
In the following we take the desired household structure P as given. It re-
mains to show the existence of a pair (p;x) so that (p;x;P) constitutes a
competitive equilibrium with free exit. A ﬁrst crucial step in the argument is
to show that with suitably chosen reduced budget sets the resulting market
excess demand relation is non-empty-valued, convex-valued, u.h.c., and sat-
isﬁes the strong form of Walras’ law. In a second step, we obtain a market
clearing price system p 2 ∆o and a respective feasible allocation x for the
hypothetical economy with reduced budget sets. In a ﬁnal step, we are going
to show that, indeed, (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
39Step 1. We consider household h maximizing, for each p 2 ∆, its aggregate





on its restricted budget set Xh(p). Because of LGA, Xh(p) is convex, compact
and non-empty. Wh is continuous and concave. Hence the set of aggregate
welfare maximizers is non-empty, convex and compact. Consequently Dh(p),
the household’s aggregate demand set, is non-empty, convex and compact.
Moreover, the constraint correspondence Xh(¢) is continuous. Therefore, by
the Maximum Theorem (Ellickson (1993; Th. 5.47)), the demand correspon-
dence Dh(¢) is u.h.c.
For each one-person household fig;i 62 h, let the household maximize, for
each p 2 ∆, its utility Ui(xi;fig) on the truncated budget set Bfig(p) \ K
which is non-empty, convex and compact. Hence Dfig(p), the set of utility
maximizers is non-empty, convex and compact. Since !i À 0, the constraint
correspondence Bfig(¢) \ K is continuous. Again by the Maximum Theorem
(Ellickson (1993; Th. 5.47)), the demand correspondence Dfig(¢) is u.h.c.
For household h, the presence of a consumer j 2 h whose preferences are
strictly monotonic in his own consumption and who does not impose any
negative externalities on other household members, implies budget exhaus-
tion. For all consumers i = 2 h, strict monotonicity of preferences implies
budget exhaustion by household fig.
Aggregation across households in P yields that Φ(¢), the market excess
demand relation resulting from reduced budget sets is non-empty-valued,
convex-valued, u.h.c., and satisﬁes the strong form of Walras’ law.
Step 2. By Theorem 6.37 of Ellickson (1993), there exists a pair (p;z) 2
∆ £ I R
` with
(a) z 2 Φ(p) and
(b) z · 0 and z = 0 whenever p À 0.





40where dg 2 Dg(p) for each g 2 P. A standard argument shows that for each
i = 2 h, if dfig maximizes i’s utility on the truncated budget set Bfig(p) \ K,
then it is also a utility maximizer on the non-truncated budget set Bfig(p).
But then strict monotonicity of i’s preferences requires p À 0. By assump-
tion, P admits at least one single-person household. Therefore, by condition
(b), z = 0. Let us write xi for dfig from now on.
Step 3. It remains to deal with household h. By deﬁnition, we have dh =
P
i2h xi where xh = (xi)i2h maximizes Wh on Xh(p). We have to show that
xh is an eﬃcient collective choice of household h under its budget constraint,
i.e. xh 2 EBh(p), and that nobody wants to leave the household at the going
prices.
Maximizing Wh on Xh(p) is the same as maximizing Wh on Bh(p) \ Kh,
subject to the additional constraint (3) for all i 2 h. We claim that if xh
maximizes Wh on Bh(p) \ Kh subject to the constraints (3), then xh is an
eﬃcient collective choice of household h with respect to the truncated budget
set Bh(p) \ Kh, without further qualiﬁcations. Namely, for some consumer
in h to do better at yh 2 Bh(p) \ Kh than at xh without making anybody
else in h worse oﬀ, would increase the value of Wh and, hence, would require
yh 62 Xh(p). But then by LGA, there is some other consumer i in h who
violates (3) at yh and, therefore, is worse oﬀ at yh than at xh, a contradiction.
After having shown that xh is an eﬃcient collective choice of household h
with respect to the truncated budget set Bh(p) \ Kh, we claim next xh 2
EBh(p). This follows from a routine argument as in the case of single-person
households. We ﬁnally claim that no household member has an incentive to
leave at the going prices. But this follows immediately from the fact that
xh 2 Xh(p). For the latter fact implies that each household member i satisﬁes
(3) and thus Ui (xh;h) ¸ Ui (x0
i(p);fig) for all i 2 h. Hence, no individual
wants to exit household h and (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium with free
exit as asserted. Q.E.D.
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